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Considerations of French Private International Law
Caroline KLEINER＊1）
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I. Introduction. What is a surrogacy?
 Surrogacy is a highly controversial issue and a widespread phenomenon in the world. 
One	 could	 think	 that	 a	 definition	 –	 at	 least	 –	 is	 one	 of	 a	 consensus.	After	 all,	 surrogacy	
implies	at	 least	 three	persons:	a	putative	parent	or	parents,	who	have	recourse	to	a	female	
to carry a child whom will be considered (whatever the means used) being the child of the 
putative	 parent(s).	 The	 facts	 are	 simple	 but	 the	 law	 is	 more	 complicated,	 and	 the	 three	
relationships that evolve from such a scheme (the relationship between the putative 
parent(s) and the surrogate mother; between the surrogate mother and the new born and 
between	 the	 putative	 parent	 and	 the	 new	 born)	 are	 apprehended	 in	 different	 ways,	
according	 to	 their	 genetic	 link,	 but	 above	 all,	 according	 to	 the	 cultural,	 social,	 and	 legal	
background	 of	 each	 country.	No	 universal	 consensus	 exists.	More	 specifically,	 the	 notion	
 ＊	Professor,	Faculty	of	Law	of	the	University	of	Strasbourg.		  
Guest	Professor,	School	of	Law,	Kansai	University	(April-May	2016)
 1）	 I	would	 like	 to	 thank	 the	Kansai	University	School	of	Law	 for	having	given	me	 the	great	 honor	 to	be	 a	
guest	professor	 for	 two	months,	and	more	particularly	professor	Yayohi	Sato	of	 the	Faculty	of	Law,	 for	her	
kind	and	devoted	attention,	for	having	proposed	me	to	deal	with	that	subject	during	a	conference	which	has	
held	in	the	premises	of	the	School	of	Law	on	21	April	2016,	and	finally	for	having	handed	to	me	the	Report	
of	the	Assisted	Reproductive	Technologies	Review	Committee	of	the	Science	Council	of	Japan	(see	footnote	
2) of which she is a member.
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of	 surrogacy	 is	 not	 at	 all	 apprehended	 in	 the	 same	 way	 in	 France	 and	 in	 Japan,	 the	
countries that will be scrutinized in this contribution. Mainly two discrepancies in the 
Japanese	context	and	in	the	French	one	might	be	noted.
	 The	first	 one	 concerns	 the	definition	of	 the	 “commissioning	person”	 (Japanese	 term)	
or	 “intended	 parent”	 (French	 term).	 The	 Science	 Council	 of	 Japan	 in	 20082）	 defines	
surrogacy	 as	 such:	 “Surrogate	 pregnancy	 refers	 to	 a	 woman 3） who wants a child (the 
commissioning female) requesting another female to conceive using reproductive 
treatment	technology	and	to	continue	that	pregnancy	and	give	birth	to	a	child,	and	for	 the	
commissioning	female	to	then	receive	that	child”.4）
 Speaking of a woman,	 and	 later	 on,	 of	 a	 wife,	 we	 can	 presume	 that	 the	 situation	
envisaged	in	 the	Japanese	Report	concerns	only	a	married	couple	who	wishes,	 for	certain	
reasons	 (medical	 or	 “for	 comfort”)	 to	 use	 a	 surrogacy	 mother.	 Single	 woman	 and	
unmarried	 couples	 are	 then	 excluded	 from	 the	 Report,	 hence	 from	 the	 scheme	 of	
surrogacy	described.	Not	to	speak	of	single	man,	who	seems	to	be	a	thousand	miles	away	
from	the	reflection	of	the	Council.
	 The	Japanese	Report	excludes	also	another	concrete	aspect	of	 this	sociological	 issue,	
which	concerns	 the	 fact	 that	homosexual	male	couples	who	cannot	conceive	a	child,	 also	
use	 surrogacy	 mothers.	 But	 quite	 strangely,	 this	 aspect	 of	 the	 problem	 has	 not	 been	
addressed.	This	exclusion	might	probably	be	explained	because	Japanese	law	already	deals	
with that problem by prohibiting homosexual couples to use assisted reproductive 
techniques	 (ART)	 and	 also	 barring	 adoption	 to	 them.	Anyhow,	 the	 situation	 exists,	 and	 I	
am not sure that the already existing regulation (i.e. prohibition) relating to that kind of 
couples	is	sufficient	to	solve	the	situation.
	 In	France,	 as	 it	 is	 the	case	 so	 far	 in	 Japan,	where	only	proposals	 exist	but	where	no	
rule	 of	 law	has	 been	 adopted	 relating	 to	 that	 issue,	 no	 legal	 definition	 exists.	Two	 recent	
reports	 have	 been	 written	 on	 this	 issue	 in	 France.	 One	 is	 350	 pages	 long,	 and	 is	 the	
common	 work	 of	 jurists,	 medical	 doctors,	 sociologists	 and	 anthropologists.	 This	 report	
titled	 “Filiation – origins – parenthood” 5）,	 achieved	 in	 2014,	 has	 been	 done	 under	 the	
mandate of the Minister for Family. This group had to think on the various needs of 
reforms	 in	Family	 law	 concerning	 legal	 parenthood,	 adoption,	 and	procreation.	An	 annex	
to	 the	 seventh	 chapter,	 dedicated	 to	 procreation	 with	 ART	 focuses	 on	 surrogate	
 2） See Report of the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Review Committee of the Science Council of Japan 
of 8 April 2008 on « Issues Related to the Assisted Reproductive Technologies Centered on Surrogate 
Pregnancy –Toward a Social Consensus– »	(hereafter:	Japanese	Report).
 3） Emphasis added.
 4）	 Japanese	Report,	p.4.
 5）	 Report	 of	 the	Working	Group	 “Filiation,	 origines,	 parentalité”	 presided	 by	 Irène	Théry,	 general	 reporter:	
Anne-Marie	Leroyer: “Filiation, origines, parentalité. Le droit face aux nouvelles valeurs de responsabilité 
générationnelle”,	2014	(hereafter:	Théry	Report).
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motherhood.	 It	must	 be	 valued	 for	 the	 efforts	made	 to	 appease	 the	 debate	 over	 this	 very	
controversial	 issue.	 The	 other	 report,	 the	 work	 of	 two	 members	 of	 the	 Senate	 (Higher	
Chamber	of	 the	French	Parliament)	 in	 20166）,	 is	 shorter	 (100	pages)	 and	 is	 very	 clear	 on	
its	 legislative	 intention,	which	 is	 to	 continue	 to	prohibit	 surrogate	motherhood,	 to	worsen	
criminal sanctions in case of abandonment of children and collusion for abandonment of 
children,	 to	 refuse	 that	 a	 child	 born	 abroad	 through	 surrogacy	 can	 establish	 its	 filiation	
towards	its	“intended	mother”.7）
	 Neither	 in	 the	 former,	 nor	 in	 the	 latter,	 a	 definition	 of	 surrogacy	 motherhood	 is	
suggested.	Yet,	 the	Report	 of	 the	Senate	 deplores	 the	 lack	 of	 precision	 of	 the	 vocabulary	
and	 remarks	 that	 different	 words	 have	 been	 alternatively	 used.	 First,	 the	 word	 full	 of	
imagery	“gestational	mother”	(a	bad	translation	of	mère porteuse, which should literally be 
translated	 by	 “carrying	 mother”)	 has	 been	 used	 to	 describe	 the	 phenomenon.	 Then	 the	
word surrogate mother (a true translation of mère de substitution) has been mainly used. 
However	 both	 reports	 address	 surrogacy	 motherhood	 whoever	 is/are	 the	 intended	
parent(s):	a	married	or	unmarried	heterosexual	couple,	a	married	or	unmarried	homosexual	
couple,	a	single	woman,	or	a	single	man.
	 Another	precision	needs	to	be	made	to	clarify	our	issue.
	 The	Japanese	Report	distinguishes	between	the	surrogate mother and the host mother. 
The	surrogate	mother	system	in	“where	a	husband’s	sperm	is	 injected	 into	 the	uterus	of	a	
third	 person	 using	 the	 technique	 of	 artificial	 insemination	 to	 cause	 fertilization…”.8） The 
host mother	 is	 the	 third	person	who	 receives	 the	embryo	created	 from	 the	wife’s	egg	and	
the	husband’s	sperms	and	who	carries	and	gives	birth	to	a	child	on	behalf	of	the	wife.	The	
embryo	received	might	also	be	created	from	donated	eggs	and	 the	husband’s	or	a	donor’s	
sperms.	The	distinction	is	stipulated	so	that	the	Japanese	Report	focuses	only	on	surrogate	
mothers.9）
	 In	 France,	 the	 distinction	 is	 also	made.	Article	 16-7	 of	 the	Civil	 Code	 distinguishes	
 6） Rapport d’information fait au nom de la commission des lois constitutionnelles, de législation, du suffrage 
universel, du Règlement et d’administration générale sur l’assistance médicale à la procréation (AMP) et la 
gestation pour autrui (GPA)	 par	 M.	 Yves	 Détraigne	 et	 Mme	 Catherine	 Tasca,	 n°409,	 session	 2015–2016	
(hereafter	 :	 Report	 of	 the	 Senate),	 available	 at	 http://www.senat.fr/notice-rapport/2015/r15-409-notice.html.	
This	Report	of	the	Senate	concerns	both	assisted	reproductive	technologies	(ART)	and	surrogate	motherhood.	
An	 earlier	 Report	 rendered	 by	 two	 other	 members	 of	 the	 Senate	 had	 already	 tackled	 this	 issue	 in	 2008	
(Rapport d’information n°421 (2007–2008) de Mme Michèle André, MM. Alain Milon et Henri de Richemont, 
fait au nom de la commission des lois et de la commission des affaires sociales, 25 juin 2008, « Contribution 
à la réflexion sur la maternité d’autrui ». This report is already too old to give a complete report of the current 
situation	in	France,	since	many	decisions	of	the	Higher	Judicial	Court	in	France	(Cour de cassation) and the 
European	Court	of	Human	Rights	have	been	rendered	after	2008.
 7） See infra.
 8）	 Japanese	Report,	p.4
 9）	 Japanese	Report,	p.4	and	25.
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between	“procreation”	and	“gestation”	 for	 the	benefit	of	 another.	The	 former	 corresponds	
to the situation where the gestational mother is also the genetic mother; the latter concerns 
the	case	where	the	gestational	mother	carries	an	embryo,	which	has	been	created	with	the	
intended	 mother’s	 egg	 or	 a	 donor’s	 egg.10）	 However,	 this	 distinction	 has	 no	 real	 impact,	
since	 both	 are	 prohibited.	 Similarly,	 a	 child	 born	 abroad	 through	 surrogacy	 motherhood	
will	 not	 be	 permitted	 to	 have	 his	 filiation	 established	 towards	 the	 intended	mother,	 even	
though	she	is	the	“genetic	mother”.11）
II. The prohibition to use a surrogate mother and to be a surrogate 
mother in France
 The state of the law in France is quite simple: it prohibits surrogacy motherhood in 
France,	 whoever	 are	 the	 intended	 parents.	 No	 special	 statute	 is	 made	 towards	
“commissioning”	 or	 “intended”	 parents	 who	 have	 no	 other	 recourse	 than	 to	 use	 a	
surrogate mother to have a child with their genes.
	 This	prohibition	is	reflected	in	civil	law,	but	also	in	criminal	law,	as	well	as	in	ethical	
norms.
1. Prohibition from a civil law point of view
	 In	 1994,	 French	 Parliament	 voted	 the	 first	 bioethics	Acts,	which	 forbid	 very	 clearly	
surrogacy.	The	Act	has	 thus	 introduced	a	new	provision	 in	 the	Civil	code	–	article	16-7	–	
which states that
 “All agreements relating to procreation or gestation for the benefit of 
another are null”.
 These acts were enacted after a famous decision of the Court of cassation decided in 
199112）	that	the	agreement	by	which	a	woman	commits	herself,	even	without	being	paid,	to	
conceive	a	child	in	order	to	abandon	him	after	his	birth,	is	contrary	to	public	policy	and	to	
the	 principle	 of	 unavailability	 of	 personal	 status.	 Therefore,	 not	 only	 is	 the	 surrogacy	
agreement	null	and	void,	but	also	no	adoption	by	the	intended	mother	or	father	of	the	new	
born	 is	 possible.	 In	 the	 same	 vein,	 this	 prohibition	makes	 it	 impossible	 for	 the	 intended	
mother to have recourse to the usual means provided for by French law 13） in order to 
10）	 See	the	Report	of	the	Senate,	p.53.
11） See infra.
12）	 A	decision	rendered	by	the	highest	chamber	of	the	Cour de cassation	(l’Assemblée plénière),	which	gives	
that	decision	a	particular	weight:	Ass.	Ple.	31	May	1991,	pourvoi	No	c.	All	decisions	cited	in	this	contribution	
are	available	on	this	website:	https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/initRechJuriJudi.do.
13）	 See	 article	 310-1	 and	 following	 of	 the	 French	 Civil	 Code.	A	 translation	 into	 English	 or	 Chinese	 of	 the	
French	Civil	Code	is	available	at:	https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/.
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establish	 its	 parent-child	 relation	 (when	 the	birth	occurred	 abroad),	 such	 as	 possession	of	
apparent status (possession d’état)14） or voluntary acknowledgment by the intended 
mother 15） or even by the genetic father.16）
	 The	scope	of	application	of	this	provision	is	general	enough	to	concern	any	situation,	
whoever	 is	 the	“intended	parent”:	a	 single	woman,	a	married	heterosexual	or	homosexual	
couple,	a	single	man.	No	exception	 is	 foreseen;	 the	prohibition	 is	 total.	More	specifically,	
the	 situation	 of	 a	 woman	 incapable	 of	 carrying	 and	 giving	 birth	 to	 a	 child,	 for	 medical	
reasons,	 is	absolutely	not	envisaged,	contrary	 to	 the	proposition	of	 the	Japanese	Report.17） 
However,	 this	de lege lata	 situation	does	not	mean	 that	no	current	 reflection	 is	on	going.	
This	 was	 precisely	 the	mandate	 of	 the	 Group	who	 authored	 the	 Théry	 Report.	 But	 their	
members disagreed on the necessity to continue with the prohibition or to regulate 
surrogacy	motherhood.	Hence,	no	proposition	is	made	in	that	regards.18） The Report of the 
Senate is much more decisive on this issue. Regulation of surrogacy motherhood is not 
contemplated; rather its continuing prohibition is desired.
 The civil sanctions are not the only one provided for by French Law.
2. Prohibition from a criminal law point of view
	 Different	 types	 of	 criminal	 offenses	 exist	 in	 French	 law	 that	 may	 be	 applied	 to	 the	
various	 protagonists	 implied	 in	 a	 surrogacy	 process:	 the	 intended	 parents,	 the	
intermediaries	 between	 commissioning	 parents	 and	 surrogate	mother,	 the	 doctors	 and	 the	
surrogate mother herself.
	 The	first	provision	has	been	introduced	in	French	Law	in	1804	and	is,	of	course,	not	
specific	 to	 surrogacy	motherhood.	 It	 concerns	more	 generally	 the	 abandonment	 of	 child,	
which	may	cover	different	situations.	Article	227-13	of	the	Penal	Code	provides	that
 “Wilful substitution, false representation or concealment which 
infringes the civil status of a child is punished by three years’ imprisonment 
and a fine of €45,000.
 Attempt to commit this offence is subject to the same penalties”.
	 Very	 few	 decisions	 condemning	 persons	 who	 committed	 that	 offence	 have	 been	
rendered in the last years.19）	Anyhow,	this	rule	is	so	broadly	described	that	any	person,	i.e.,	
14）	 See	Court	of	cassation,	1st	Civil	Chamber,	6	April	2011,	pourvoi	No	09-17130.
15）	 See	Rennes	Court	of	Appeal,	4	July	2002,	No	01/02471.
16）	 See	Court	of	cassation,	1st	Civil	Chamber,	13	September	2013,	pourvoi	No	12-18.315	and	No	12-30.138.
17）	 See	Japanese	Report,	p.26.
18）	 See	Théry	Report,	p.186.	However,	members	of	the	group	agreed	on	the	fact	that	it	is	important	and	urgent	
to	recognize	in	French	law	the	filiation	of	children	born	abroad	through	a	surrogate	mother.
19）	 According	to	the	Ministry	of	Justice,	4	convictions	were	granted	in	2013,	2	in	2012	and	4	in	2011.	Those	
data	are	mentioned	in	the	Report	of	the	Senate,	p.56.
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the	 intended	 parents,	 the	 intermediary	 between	 the	 intended	 parents	 and	 the	 surrogate	
mother,	 and	 the	 surrogate	 mother	 are	 possible	 offenders.	 This	 severe	 measure	 is	 not	
understandable	as	far	the	surrogate	mother	is	concerned.	The	Japanese	report	shows	much	
more consideration for the particular position of this woman by proposing that surrogate 
mothers should be excluded of any punishment.20）	Not	without	reason,	 the	Japanese	report	
states	 that	“the	surrogate	mother	 is	 the	victim	who	has	 taken	on	 the	burden	of	pregnancy	
and	childbirth,	and	as	such,	would	be	excluded	from	punishment”.	It	should	be	noted	that	
the punishment mentioned in this report are non-criminal punishment. This kind of legal 
sanctions	are	considered	too	harsh	and	inefficient	in	the	Japanese	Report	to	prevent	illegal	
surrogate motherhood.
	 The	 second	 possible	 offense	 according	 to	 which	 surrogacy	 motherhood	 might	 be	
criminally	sanctioned	is	enshrined	in	Article	227-12	of	the	Penal	code.	It	provides	that
 “The incitement of the parents or one of them to abandon a born or 
unborn child, made either for pecuniary gain, or by gifts, promises, threats 
or abuse of authority, is punished by six months’ imprisonment and a fine of 
€7,500 €.
 Acting for pecuniary gain as an intermediary between a person desiring 
to adopt a child and a parent desiring to abandon its born or unborn child 
is punished by one year’s imprisonment and a fine of €15,000.
 The penalties provided by the second paragraph apply to acting as an 
intermediary between a person or a couple desiring to receive a child and a 
woman agreeing to bear this child with the intent to give it up to them. 
Where the offence is habitually committed for pecuniary gain, the penalties 
incurred are doubled.
 Attempt to commit the offences referred to under the second and third 
paragraphs of the present article is subject to the same penalties”.
	 Whereas	 article	 227-13	 concerns	 primarily	 the	 parents	 (intended	 parents	 or	 the	
surrogate	 mother),	 this	 offence	 addresses	 primarily	 to	 third	 persons,	 intermediaries	 who	
propose their services for the arrangement of surrogacy motherhood and doctors who 
monitor the process.
	 Whatever	 the	 reasons	 are,	 both	 French	 reports	 remark	 that	 very	 few	 surrogacy	
motherhood take place in France. Is it because the participation to a surrogacy procedure 
is	 a	 criminal	 offense	 and	 that	 intended	 parents,	 doctors	 and	 surrogate	 mother	 fear	 a	
possible punishment? Or is it because the general sociological condemnation of this 
20）	 See	Japanese	Report,	p.25	and	29.
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phenomenon in France makes it unconfessable to have recourse to surrogacy motherhood 
or	to	be	used	as	a	gestational	mother?	Nobody	can	tell.	What	is	certain,	on	the	contrary,	is	
that	 French	 couples	 or	 French	 single	 persons	 prefer	 to	 go	 abroad.	 Since	 those	 offences,	
when	committed	abroad	by	French	Nationals	may	not	be	prosecuted	 in	France,	unless	 an	
element	 of	 the	 offense	 took	 place	 in	 France,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 foreign	 country	 where	 the	
surrogacy	 motherhood	 took	 place	 does	 not	 consider	 it	 as	 an	 offence.	 In	 those	
circumstances,	the	intended	parents	–	who	travel	to	countries	where	surrogacy	motherhood	
is	 legal	 –	 are	 assured	 not	 to	 be	 prosecuted	 if	 they	 go	 abroad	 to	 contract	 a	 foreign	
gestational mother domiciled abroad.
3. Situation from an ethical point of view
	 Debate	 is	 hysterical	 and	French	 society	 is	 very	 divided	on	 the	 subject.	The	 fact	 that	
the	Thery	 group	 could	 not	 find	 a	 compromise	 on	 this	 subject,	 shows	 how	 divided	 is	 the	
issue	 in	 France.	 For	 instance,	 a	 short	 philosophical	 essay	written	 by	S.	Agacinski,	Corps 
en miettes 21）,	(literally:	Body in pieces)	shows	how	difficult	it	 is	to	have	an	elaborated	and	
educated	debate	on	that	matter.	Opinions	are	usually	very	sharp,	even	when	elaborated	by	
jurists.22）	 Unfortunately,	 the	 discussion	 of	 this	 issue	 has	 been	 increasingly	 spoiled	 by	 the	
debate,	 which	 surrounded	 the	 adoption	 in	 May	 2013	 (and	 even	 after)	 of	 the	 Act	 of	
“marriage	for	all”.23）
	 The	French	National	Consultative	Ethics	Committee	for	Health	and	Life	Sciences	has	
rendered	an	opinion	 in	201024）,	which	addresses	 the	 issue	of	whether	 it	 is	 ethically	 sound	
to	add	gestational	surrogacy	to	the	list	of	authorized	ART	procedures.	Its	conclusion,	after	
having	 analyzed	 a	 set	 of	 reasons,	 is	 that	 the	 arguments	 in	 favor	 of	 keeping	 existing	
legislation	 as	 it	 currently	 is	 have	 prevailed	 over	 those	 in	 favor	 of	 legalizing	 this	 ART	
procedure,	even	if	it	were	strictly	limited	and	controlled.
 Surrogacy motherhood is then also condemned from an ethical point of view. This 
prohibition,	 must	 be	 criticized	 not	 only	 for	 its	 intransigence	 and	 the	 absence	 of	
consideration	 for	 severe	problems	of	 infertility,	 but	 also	 for	 its	quasi	 inefficiency.	 Indeed,	
as	 it	has	already	been	mentioned,	 intended	parents	may	go	abroad	 to	benefit	from	foreign	
legislation which authorize gestational surrogacy. This situation cannot be solved by a 
pure	 prohibition,	 nor	 by	 diplomatic	 discussions	 with	 countries	 authorizing	 surrogacy	 in	
order	 to	bar	access	of	French	nationals	 to	surrogacy	as	 the	Report	of	 the	Senate	suggests,	
since	it	denies	real	births	occurred	abroad	and	is	prejudicial	to	the	children,	who	cannot	be	
21）	 Paris,	Flammarion,	2009
22）	 See	M.	Fabre-Magnan,	La gestation pour autrui,	Paris,	Fayard,	2013.
23）	 Act	No	2013-404	of	17	May	2013	granting	access	to	marriage	to	same	sex	couples.
24）	 The	 opinion	 is	 available	 in	 English	 on	 this	 website:	 http://www.ccne-ethique.fr/en/publications/ethical-
issues-raised-gestational-surrogacy-gs#.WBCKRFtyFb0.
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punished for the acts of their parents.25）
III.	Effects	in	France	of	surrogate	motherhood	made	abroad
	 French	case	law	has	very	recently	evolved	on	that	 issue.	Although	French	courts,	 for	
a	very	 long	 time,	disregarded	children	born	abroad	by	surrogacy,	 those	children	still	exist	
and have a legitimate right of construing their identity.26） The child-parent relationship 
belongs	obviously	 to	 that	 identity.	Now,	when	a	genetic	 link	exists	between	 the	child	and	
the	 father,	 the	 father	 is	 recognized	 as	 the	 legal	 father.	 The	 European	 Court	 of	 Human	
Rights	 has	made	 this	 progress	 possible	 only	 after	 the	 condemnation	 of	 France.	However,	
the	situation	of	the	intended	mother,	is	still	 in	a	legal	vacuum.
	 Before	entering	 into	more	details	 in	 that	evolution	of	French	case	 law,	 it	 should	first	
be explained what kind of requests introduced by intended parents are made before French 
authorities.	 Second,	 the	 different	 rules	 usually	 applied	 to	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 public	
documents	 and	 foreign	 judgments	 should	 be	 briefly	 explained.	 Third,	 the	 decisions	 of	
French courts regarding this question will be scrutinized.
1. What it is to be recognized?
	 A	 child	 who	 has	 been	 given	 birth	 by	 a	 surrogate	 mother,	 as	 any	 other	 children,	 is	
registered	 in	 the	 registries	 of	 the	 State	where	 he	 is	 born.	However,	 the	 laws	 of	 countries	
which	recognize	and	regulate	surrogate	motherhood	are	very	different	as	 to	how	the	child	
should be signed up.27） Sometimes the gestational mother is mentioned in the birth 
certificate;	 sometimes	only	 the	 intended	parents	are	mentioned,	as	 the	 legal	parents.	Such	
is	 the	 case	 in	Ukraine,	 a	 very	 friendly	 surrogacy	State,	where	 commissioning	parents	 are	
considered	 the	 child’s	 legal	 parents	 from	 the	 moment	 of	 conception.	 Sometimes	 the	
process	 of	 registration	 of	 the	 new	 born	 takes	 place	 only	 within	 administrative	 bodies,	
sometimes	the	approval	of	a	judge	is	necessary.	This	is	the	case	for	instance	in	California,	
where	 a	 judgment	 is	 given,	 a	 few	 days	 after	 the	 birth	 (or	 even	 before),	 authorizing	 the	
registration of the child with the intended father as the father and the intended mother as 
“the	 legal	 mother”.	 This	 is	 also	 the	 case	 in	 England,	 where	 intended	 parents	 may	
introduce	 a	 request	 within	 6	 months	 after	 the	 birth	 for	 a	 parental order which transfers 
legal rights from the birth mother to the intended parents. The parental order may be 
25）	 See	 H.	 Fulchiron	 and	 Christine	 Bidaud-Garon,	 “Ne	 punissez	 pas	 les	 enfants	 des	 fautes	 de	 leurs	
pères.	Regard	prospectif	sur	les	arrêts	Labassée	et	Mennesson	de	la	CEDH	du	26	juin	2014”,	Recueil Dalloz 
2014,	p.1773.
26）	 See	also	A.	Chaigneau,	“Pour	un	droit	du	lien	:	le	débat	sur	la	gestation	pour	autrui	comme	catalyseur	d’un	
droit	de	 la	filiation	renouvelé”,	Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil	2016,	p.263,	who	argues	for	a	renewal	of	
French	 law	 of	 parenthood	 relationship,	 which	 should	 stop	 aping	 natural	 procreation,	 since	 new	 biological	
techniques create new ways of becoming « parent ».
27）	 See	D.	Sindres,	“Le	tourisme	procréatif	et	le	dip”,	Journal du Droit International	2015,	doctr.	4,	n°9
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issued only if at least one of the intended parents is genetically related to the child. In 
those	cases,	Family	Courts	control	the	surrogacy	process	and	the	interests	of	all	parties.
 Those precisions are of importance since the rules of recognition of an act made abroad 
differ,	 whether	 it	 is	 considered	 a	 “judgment”	 or	 a	 “civil	 status	 record”	 or	 a	 “public	
document”.
2. Potential applicable Rules of recognition and transcription
	 Rules	to	recognize	a	foreign	decision	are	twofold	in	France.	First,	it	might	depend	on	
the	country	where	the	judgment	has	been	issued.	Indeed,	if	the	decision	has	been	rendered	
by	a	jurisdiction	of	a	member	State	of	the	European	Union	(EU),	which	concerns	a	matter	
covered	 by	 a	Regulation	 of	 the	EU,	 then	 the	 rules	 of	 recognition	 of	 that	Regulation	will	
apply.	 However,	 neither	Brussels I Regulation 28） nor Brussels II Regulation 29） foresee in 
their	material	scope	of	application	questions	of	filiation.	Indeed,	article	1	§3	a)	of	Brussels 
II	Regulation	excludes	“the	establishment	or	contesting	of	a	parent-child	relationship”	and	
article	 1	 §2	 a)	 of	 Brussels I	 Regulation	 excludes	 “status or legal capacity of natural 
persons”	from	their	scopes	of	application.	Second,	where	no	EU	Regulation	is	applicable,	
the	 rules	 of	 recognition	 of	 foreign	 judgment	 are	 those	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 international	
conventions	 to	which	 France	 is	 a	 party,	 or	 by	 French	 law.	 In	 that	 respect,	 no	 provisions	
are set forth either in the Civil Code or in the Civil Procedural Code. Rules applied by 
French courts have been construed by case law.30）	Today,	the	conditions	of	recognition	and	
execution	of	foreign	judgments	are:
•	 	Foreign	 court	 had	 jurisdiction	 to	 give	 the	 judgment;	 its	 jurisdiction	 is	
assessed	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 “sufficient	 link”	 with	 the	 dispute,	 upon	 the	
condition	 that	 French	 court	 had	 no	 exclusive	 jurisdiction	 on	 the	 subject	
matter of the dispute
•		Foreign	 judgment	 shall	 not	 be	 contrary	 to	 the	 international	 conception	of	
French public policy
•		Foreign	judgment	shall	not	be	given	by	fraud.
	 By	contrast,	rules	of	recognition	of	public	documents	are	different	and	simpler.	Article	
28）	 Regulation	 (EU)	No	1215/2012	of	 the	European	Parliament	and	of	 the	Council	of	12	December	2012	on	
jurisdiction	and	the	recognition	and	enforcement	of	judgments	in	civil	and	commercial	matters	(recast).
29）	 Regulation	 (EC)	 No	 2201/2003	 of	 27	 November	 2003	 concerning	 jurisdiction	 and	 the	 recognition	 and	
enforcement	 of	 judgments	 in	 matrimonial	 matters	 and	 the	 matters	 of	 parental	 responsibility,	 repealing	
Regulation	(EC)	No	1347/2000.
30）	 See	P.	Mayer	and	V.	Heuzé,	Droit international privé,	Paris,	Monchrestien,	2015,	n°460	;	B.	Audit	and	L.	
d’Avout,	 Droit international privé,	 Paris,	 Economica,	 2014,	 n°333	 ;	 P.	 Bourel,	 Y.	 Loussouarn	 and	 P.	 de	
Vareilles-Sommières,	Droit international privé,	Paris	Dalloz,	2015,	n°210	;	D.	Bureau	and	H.	Muir	Watt,	Droit 
international privé	vol.1,	Paris	PUF,	2015,	n°135.
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47	of	the	French	Civil	Code	sets	forth	that
 “Full faith must be given to acts of civil status of French persons and 
of aliens made in a foreign country and drawn up in the forms in use in 
that country, unless other records or documents retained, external evidence, 
or elements drawn from the act itself establish, after all useful verifications 
if necessary, that the act is irregular, forged, or that the facts declared 
therein do not square with the truth”.
	 Truth	is,	this	provision	does	not	concern	the	issue	of	recognition but consists in a rule 
of	 evidence.	What	 article	 47	 simply	 states	 is	 that	 a	 foreign	 public	 document	 should	 be	
given	full	faith	and	credit.	But	this	implies	also	that,	if	what	is	stated	in	the	foreign	public	
document	 shall	 be	 considered	 the	 truth,	 a	 request	 based	 on	 this	 document	 shall	 be	
awarded.	 This	 provision	 has	 been	 used	 for	 instance	 for	 the	 issuance	 of	 certificates	 of	
French	nationality	of	children	born	abroad	from	a	surrogate	mother.	A	circulaire 31） (a sort 
of	 practice	 statement	 issued	 by	 the	 Government,	 addressed	 to	 public	 officers	 for	 the	
application	of	a	certain	provision)	made	in	2013	by	the	then	Minister	of	Justice,	Christine	
Taubira,	 explained	 that	 public	 officers	 had	 to	 grant	 a	 certificate	 of	 French	 nationality	
requested	 by	 French	 parents	 of	 children	 born	 abroad,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 this	 article,	 even	
though it could be presumed that the child had been procreated by a gestational mother. 
This circulaire	clarified	the	situation	of	parents	who	could	not	return	to	France,	with	their	
child	 born	 in	 a	 foreign	 country,	 because	 the	 child	 was	 refused	 the	 issuance	 of	 a	 French	
passport on the basis that the new born had been given birth by a surrogate mother.32）
 This provision could also be used to consider the foreign public document establishing 
the	 parent-child	 relationship	 between	 the	 child	 and	 the	 intended	 parent(s),	 and	 then	
registering the child in the French public registries as the child of the intended parents. 
However,	 this	 provision	 has	 not	 served	 that	 purpose,	 until	 very	 recently.	 Indeed,	 the	 fact	
that the child has been procreated by a surrogacy mother has been considered to be 
contrary	to	French	public	policy,	which	paralyzed	any	effect	such	foreign	public	document	
could	 have	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 article	 47	 of	 the	 Civil	 Code.	 Although	 a	 public	 policy	
exception	 is	 not	 specified	 in	 this	 article,	 French	 courts	 have	 always	 considered	 it	 to	
supersede any other provisions.
3.  From a strict refusal to recognize the parent-child relationship established in a foreign 
country towards the recognition of the legal parenthood of the genetic father
 When parents begun to introduce before French courts requests contesting the refusal 
31）	 Circ.	NOR	JUSC1301528C,	25	January	2013
32） See for instance the decision of the Conseil d’Etat	(Highest	Cour	of	the	administrative	courts	system)	:	CE,	
4	May	2011.
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of	French	authorities	 to	recognize	 the	 legal	parenthood	established	by	Foreign	authorities,	
the	answers	have	been	 the	same:	 the	 refusal	of	 recognition	was	 justified	 for	public	policy	
reason.	Hence,	whatever	type	of	document	those	parents	produced	(a	judgment	or	a	public	
document),	 the	 attitude	 of	 French	 courts	 was	 the	 same.	 Surrogacy	 agreement	 being	
contrary to public policy; no legal relationship may be inferred from a surrogacy.33） In two 
decisions	 rendered	 in	 201134）,	 where	 French	 couples	 brought	 to	 French	 registries	 the	
foreign birth certificate	 made	 in	 California,	 as	 a	 proof	 of	 their	 legal	 parenthood	 (as	
provided	 for	 by	 article	 47	 of	 the	 French	Civil	 code),	 the	Court	 did	 not	 look	 at	 the	 birth	
certificate,	 but	 at	 the	 judgment	 upon	 which	 such	 certificate	 was	 issued	 (the	 judge	
authorized the intended parents to be registered as genetic father and legal mother). 
Indeed,	 there	 is	 no	 “public	 policy”	 ground	 to	 refuse	 to	 give	 effect	 to	 a	 foreign	 public	
document.	However,	 such	 ground	 exists	 to	 refuse	 the	 recognition	 of	 a	 foreign	 judgment.	
French authorities exercise a double control of what is stated in the foreign public 
document. If the parenthood has been established on the basis of a surrogacy agreement 
(“une convention portant sur la gestation pour le compte d’autrui”),	no	 legal	 relationship	
may	be	established	because	it	would	be	contrary	to	the	principle	of	“unavailability	of	civil	
status”,	given	the	fact	that	such	agreement	is	contrary	to	article	16-7	of	the	Civil	code.
	 Then,	 in	 subsequent	decisions	given	 in	201335）,	 the	Court	of	 cassation	maintained	 its	
position	but	changed	its	reasoning.	Instead	of	invoking	a	violation	of	French	public	policy,	
the	 Court	 insisted	 on	 the	 fact	 that	 those	 surrogacy	 agreements,	 though	 entered	 into	 in	
conformity	 with	 local	 law,	 were	 concluded	 in	 circumvention	 of	 the	 law,	 by	 fraud.	As	 a	
consequence,	 it	was	contrary	 to	public	policy	 to	give	effects	(establishing	 the	parent-child	
relationships)	 to	 an	 agreement	 concluded	 by	 fraud.	 Even	 when	 only	 the	 father,	 who	 is	
genetically	related	 to	 the	child,	 requests	recognition	of	his	 legal	parenthood	established	in	
India	(where	 the	Indian	birth	certificate	mentions	 the	name	of	 the	surrogate	mother	as	 the	
legal	 mother),	 French	 authorities	 were	 said	 to	 be	 right,	 when	 they	 refuse	 to	 register	 the	
child as the son of this father.36）	In	this	decision,	even	when	the	birth	certificate	reflects	the	
genetic	reality,	no	legal	parenthood	has	been	recognized.
	 The	situation	of	those	children	is	disastrous.	They	suffer	from	what	is	called	in	French	
33）	 See	Court	of	cassation,	1st	Civil	chamber,	17	December	2008,	No	07-20468.
34）	 Court	of	cassation,	1st	Civil	chamber,	6	April	2011,	Epoux Mennesson c. Ministère public	No	10-19053	and	
M. F. Labassée et autres c. Ministère public	 No	09-17130.	 Those	 decisions	 have	 been	 brought	 before	 the	
European	Court	on	Human	Rights,	which	rendered	two	decisions	on	26	June	2016	(see	infra).
35）	 Court	of	 cassation,	1st	Civil	Chamber,	13	September	2013,	No	12-30.138	and	No	12-18.315.	See	also	H.	
Fulchiron	 et	 C.	 Bidaud-Garon,	 «	L’enfant	 de	 la	 fraude	 …	 Réflexions	 sur	 le	 statut	 des	 enfants	 nés	 avec	
l’assistance	 d’une	 mère	 porteuse	», D.	 2014,	 p.905.	 Those	 decisions	 have	 also	 been	 brought	 before	 the	
European	on	Human	Rights,	which	rendered	a	decision	21	July	2016	(see	infra).
36）	 Court	of	Cassation,	1st	Civil	Chamber,	19	March	2014	N°13-50.005.
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private	international	law	a	“statut	boiteux”	(unstable	status).	They	are	recognized	to	be	the	
children	 of	 the	 intended	 parents	 in	 the	 country	 of	 their	 birth,	 but	 are	 the	 children	 of	 no	
one	 in	 France.	 As	 a	 consequence,	 children	 do	 not	 have	 any	 specific	 inheritance	 right;	
non-recognized parents need to ask to French courts the authorization to exercise some 
rights a parent usually has (autorité parentale) and the family has trouble to travel since 
their	passports	do	not	 show	 that	 they	belong	 to	 the	 same	 family.	Even	 in	 such	 situations,	
allegations	 made	 by	 parents	 of	 a	 violation	 of	 article	 3	 §1	 of	 the	 1989	 New	 York	
Convention	on	the	rights	of	the	child,	which	states	that
 “In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities 
or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a primary 
consideration”.
were disregarded by French courts.
	 French	 families	 suffering	 from	 that	 situation	 have	 then	 brought	 the	 issue	 before	 the	
European	 Court	 of	 Human	 Rights.	 In	 two	 cases	 decided	 on	 June	 26,	 2014,37） applicants 
(parents and children) claimed that their right to respect for family and private life 
(fundamental	 rights	 guaranteed	 by	 article	 8	 of	 the	 European	 Convention	 on	 Human	
Rights)	 had	 been	 infringed.	Concerning	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 family	 life,	 the	European	
Court	 decided	 that	 no	 violation	 has	 been	 committed	 by	 France.	 For	 the	 European	Court,	
the decision of the Court of Cassation 38）	“strikes	a	fair	balance	between	the	interests	of	the	
applicants	 and	 those	 of	 the	 State”.	 It	 decided	 that	 France	 has	 a	 legitimate	 interest	 to	
prohibit	 surrogacy	agreements	and	 the	 family	has	been	able	 to	enjoy	 in	France	 their	 right	
to	 respect	 for	 their	 family	 life,	 since	 they	 were	 able	 to	 settle	 in	 France	 shortly	 after	 the	
birth and are in a position to live there together in conditions broadly comparable to those 
of	 other	 families.	 However,	 the	 right	 to	 respect	 for	 private	 life	 of	 the	 children	 has	 been	
infringed.	Indeed,	the	Court	says	that	respect	for	private	life	requires	that	everyone	should	
be able to establish details of their identity as individual human being. The legal parent-
child	 relationship	 belongs	 to	 that	 identity.	 Furthermore,	 nationality	 is	 an	 element	 of	 a	
person’s	identity.	And	the	children	in	those	cases	were	not	French,	because	they	could	not	
established before French authorities their link to their father. The Court remarks that the 
fact	 that	 the	 legal	 parenthood	with	 the	 father,	who	 is	 genetically	 related	 to	 them,	was	 all	
the	more	 problematic.	Another	 ruling	 given	 by	 the	 European	Court	 in	 July	 2016	 against	
France adopts the same reasoning.39）
37） Labassée v. France,	Case	No	65941/11	and	Menesson v. France,	Case	No	65192/11	(decision	available	in	
English:	http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-145389%22].
38）	 The	decisions	of	6	April	2011	previously	described.
39） Foulon and Bouvet v. France,	Case	No	9063/14	and	10410/14	(21	July	2016).
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	 Consequently,	 when	 the	 French	 Court of Cassation has been seized again of this 
question,	 the	 Assemblee plenière	 (plenary	 session	 which	 comprises	 judges	 from	 the	 six	
chambers	 of	 the	 Court	 of	 cassation)	 rendered	 two	 decisions	 in	 July	 2015,	 which	 reverse	
its prior position.40）	Both	 cases	 concerned	 children	born	 in	Moscow.	The	birth	 certificates	
established	by	Russian	authorities	designated	the	applicant,	a	French	national,	as	the	father	
and	the	Russian	surrogate	mother,	as	the	legal	mother.	In	both	cases,	the	fathers	requested	
the	 entry	 of	 the	 Russian	 birth	 certificate	 in	 the	 French	 entries,	 which	 was	 denied	 by	
French	 courts,	 since	 a	 surrogacy	 agreement	 was	 suspected.	 The	 Court	 of	 cassation	
annulled those decisions and decided that to the extent that the particulars stated in the 
foreign	 birth	 certificate	 were	 true,	 French	 authorities	 had	 misapplied	 article	 47	 of	 the	
French	 Civil	 code	 by	 refusing	 to	 give	 full	 faith	 to	 the	 foreign	 documents.	 Hence,	 the	
current	position	of	 the	Highest	Court	 in	France	is	 that	surrogate	motherhood	alone	cannot	
justify	 the	 refusal	 to	 transcribe	 into	French	birth	 registers	 the	 foreign	birth	certificate	of	a	
child	who	has	one	French	parent,	a	reasoning	finally	based	on	article	47	of	the	Civil	code.	
The Court of cassation does not say that surrogacy is not not contrary to public policy 
anymore. What it says is that the public policy requirement is not a requirement anymore 
(and,	 in	fact,	never	was).	In	 this	regard,	 the	French	Court	of	cassation	complies	a minima 
with the decision of the European Court.41）	Consequently,	 the	 only	 grounds	 for	 refusal	 of	
transcription	of	foreign	birth	certificate	are	 the	one	stated	in	article	47.	If	 the	document	 is	
either	unlawful,	or	forged	or	where	facts	declared	therein	do	not	correspond	to	the	reality,	
the	 foreign	 public	 document	 cannot	 produce	 any	 effect.	 So	 when	 the	 foreign	 certificate	
mentions	 the	 intended	 mother	 as	 the	 legal	 mother,	 the	 act	 is	 refused	 to	 produce	 effects,	
since the particulars declared do not correspond to the biological reality.42）
	 There	 is	an	undisputable	progress.	The	situation	of	 the	 intended	father,	as	 long	as	he	
is	genetically	related	with	the	child,	is	settled.	However,	the	position	of	the	French	highest	
Court	 is	 still	 awkward	 towards	 the	 intended	mother.	 Indeed,	 the	mother	 is,	 under	 French	
law,	 the	woman	who	gives	birth,	whatever	are	her	genetic	 link	with	 the	child.	Hence,	 the	
woman	 who	 gives	 birth	 to	 a	 child	 procreated	 with	 a	 donor’s	 egg	 is	 automatically	
considered	 to	 be	 the	 woman’s	 embryo	 as	 soon	 as	 it	 is	 inseminated	 in	 her	 uterus.	
40）	 Court	of	Cassation,	Plenary	session,	3	July	2015,	No	14-21.323,	No	15-50.002.
41）	 In	this	regard,	the	new	position	of	the	German	Federal	Court	is	much	more	progressive.	In	its	ruling	of	10	
December	2014	(Case	XII	ZB	463/13),	the	German	Federal	Court	of	Justice	(Bundesgerichtshof	–	BGH),	held	
that	recognition	of	the	Californian	judgment	could	not	be	refused	on	the	grounds	of	violation	of	public	policy	
and	 ordered	 the	 civil	 registry	 office	 to	 register	 the	 child’s	 birth	 and	 state	 the	 appellants	 as	 the	 joint	 legal	
parents. The Court found that German public policy was not violated by the mere fact that legal parenthood 
in	 a	 case	 of	 surrogacy	 treatment	was	 assigned	 to	 the	 intended	 parents,	 if	 one	 intended	 parent	was	 also	 the	
child’s	biological	father	while	the	surrogate	mother	had	no	genetic	relation	to	the	child.
42）	 See	for	instance:	Rennes	Court	of	appeal,	28	September	2015	(No	14/05537,	No	14/07321)	which	concern	
two	 birth	 certificates	 in	 India	 and	 in	 the	 United	 States.	 Judges	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 had	 acknowledged	 the	
parent-child	relation	of	the	intended	mother,	but	the	Court	of	appeal	reversed	the	judgments.
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Accordingly,	 when	 a	 surrogate	 mother	 carries	 and	 gives	 birth	 to	 a	 child	 who	 was	
procreated	by	the	intended	mother’s	egg	and	intended	father’s	gamete,	she	is	considered	to	
be the mother. French law continues to stick to a very old vision of maternity: the mother 
has	to	give	birth.	If	 in	most	births,	 it	corresponds	to	the	genetic	reality,	 it	 is	not	necessary	
the case. The intended mother is left in a legal vacuum. Even if she considered as the 
legal	mother	 in	 the	 country	 of	 birth,	 her	 status	will	 not	 be	 recognized	 as	 such.	The	 only	
possibility for her to establish her parent relationship with the child would then be the 
traditional means to acknowledge the status of a mother: possession of apparent status 
(possession d’état)	 or	 the	 adoption	 of	 the	 child.	 So	 far,	 those	 various	 means	 have	 been	
denied. But those decisions 43） were given prior the overruling decisions of the Assemblée 
plénière	 in	 July	2015.	One	could	however	find	an	analogical	 reasoning	based	on	a	 recent	
decision	 given	 by	 the	Court	 of	 appeal	 in	Dijon	which	 refused	 the	 adoption	 by	 a	man	 of	
the	son	of	his	husband,	who	was	given	birth	by	a	surrogate	mother	in	the	United	States.44） 
In	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 surrogacy	 agreement,	 this	 adoption	 should	 have	 been	 possible,	
according	 to	 the	new	Act	 of	 201345）,	which,	 along	with	 the	marriage	of	 same	 sex	 couple,	
permit same sex couples to adopt a child. So this decision shows the reluctance of some 
French courts to abandon their traditional position.
V. Conclusion
 French law needs to be changed. Those changes should not be left in the hands of 
courts.	 It	 is	 up	 to	 the	 legislator	 to	 take	 some	 action.	 First,	 as	 soon	 as	 parenthood	 is	
recognized	abroad,	 the	 relationship	should	also	be	 recognized	 in	France.	This	 should	also	
be the case if the foreign document stipulates that the intended mother is the legal mother; 
French traditional vision of motherhood should be overturned and more coherent with 
newest	technologies	and	sociological	reforms.	Moreover,	we	are	living	in	a	paradox.	Why	
the	 genetic	 truth	 should	 be	 of	 such	 importance	when	 the	 procreation	 takes	 place	 abroad,	
and	 then	 disregarded	 when	 a	 woman	 receives	 a	 donor’s	 egg	 in	 France?	 Second,	 French	
civil law should also be modernized in order to take into account a crucial factor so far 
denied in the establishment of parent-child relationship: the commitment of being 
parent.46）
43） Cited supra	footnote	14,	15	and	16.
44）	 Dijon	Court	of	appeal,	24	March	2016,	No	15/00057.
45） See footnote 23.
46）	 A.	Chaigneau,	cited	footnote	26.
